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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Appellate Court err in failing to enforce the

mandatory joinder of a necessary party required by Rule 19(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure?

2.

Did the Appellate Court err in deciding that as a matter

of law an obligee who authorizes a co-obligee to enforce their
joint claim is not subject to the mandatory joinder requirements
of Rule 19 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

3.

Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the

district court's failure to properly analyze the issue of joinder
under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, was harmless error.

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989).
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
On March 2, 1989, Appellant petitioned this Court for a Writ
of Certiorari to review a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
entered on January 12, 1989.

That decision affirmed the district

court's granting of Partial Summary Judgment against Appellant.
On January 31, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order
denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.

ACM/ms
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This Court granted

Appellant's petition and issued a Writ of Certiorari on July 12,
1989.

The provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(a) and Section 78-2-

2(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, confer on this Court
jurisdiction to review the decision

in question by Writ of

Certiorari•
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
RULE 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest.
Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought;
and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state
of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same
effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
RULE 19.

Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.

(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not
been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.
If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff.
If the joined party objects to venue and his
ACM/ms
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joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he
shall be dismissed from the action.
(b)
Determination by court whenever joinder not
feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2)
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed,
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The
factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which , by protective provisions in the judgment,
by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can
be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 11, 1986, Appellant and Sidney and Theresa Seftel
(Seftels) initiated a civil action against Capital City Bank in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
In that action they sought a declaration of their liabilities under
guaranty agreements which they executed in favor of Capital City
Bank (Capital) and the Small Business Administration (SBA) as joint
obligees.
of

an

R. 2-21. The guaranty agreements were executed as part

SBA

guaranteed

loan

between

Capital

and

Bagel

Nosh

Intermountain, Ltd. (Bagel Nosh).

The SBA guaranteed loan was obtained by Bagel Nosh to provide
construction financing for the opening of a Bagel Nosh restaurant
in Park City, Utah.

Appellant and the Seftels were the majority

shareholders and principals of Bagel Nosh.
ACM/ms
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On November 8, 1984,

Bagel Nosh filed a petition for relief from creditors under Chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

11 USC Section 1101 et

seq.

On April 7# 1986, Capital filed its answer and counterclaim
in which it sought entry of a judgment against the Appellant and
Seftels for the principal sum of $265,848.07 plus interest and the
entry of judgment declaring that the guaranties and associated
trust deeds were valid obligations of Appellant and the Seftels and
that the trust deeds be judicially foreclosed and the real property
covered thereby sold as provided by law.

R. 24-45.

On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
in which it sought dismissal of Appellant's complaint and judgment
as prayed on its counterclaim.

R. 79-99, 100-102. On February 4,

1987, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision granting
Capital the requested relief.

R. 308-313.

On May 20, 1987, the

district court entered a Partial Final Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure against Appellant and Seftels.

R. 378-384.

On June

4, 1987r the Appellant and Seftels filed their Notice of Appeal
from that judgment to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

On July 23, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to
the Utah Court of Appeals. Following oral argument, on January 12,
1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment.
ACM/ms

On January 26, 1989, appellants filed a Petition for
4

Rehearing before the Court of Appeals which was denied on January
31# 1989.

On March 2, 1989 Appellant filed a petition for Writ of
Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court,
Court

granted

Appellant's

petition

and

On June 12, 1989 this
issued

its

Writ

of

Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about November 15, 1979, Bagel Nosh applied for a

SBA guaranteed loan with Capital in the amount of $300,000. Under
the terms of that loan, which is governed by Title 13 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, the SBA agreed to participate in the loan
and guaranteed ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding obligation
to Capital. R. 187. At the time Bagel Nosh applied for the loan,
Appellant and the Seftels were the majority stockholders and
principals of Bagel Nosh.
Appellant

As part of the loan transaction,

and the Seftels were required

to execute personal

guaranties presented on SBA's Form 148 and issue trust deeds on
condominiums the parties owned in Snowbird, Utah, as security for
the guaranties.

2. On December 24, 1979, the SBA guaranteed loan was approved
and a loan agreement and promissory note executed by Bagel Nosh in
favor of Capital.

ACM/ms

R. 105-106.

5

3.

The proceeds of the loan were used by Bagel Nosh for the

construction and equipping of a Bagel Nosh restaurant in Park City,
Utah.

4. Under the terms of the Form 148 guaranties, Appellant and
the Seftels agreed to guaranty payment of the total loan amount to
the SBA and Capital as joint obligees. R. 129, 133. As additional
collateral for the loan, Bagel Nosh granted Capital a security
interest in all its equipment and assets.

5.

Following disbursement of the loan proceeds, Bagel Nosh

constructed

its

restaurant

facilities

and

began

operations.

Appellant is not a resident of the State of Utah and did not have
any

responsibility

restaurant.

for

the

management

or

operation

of

the

As with any start up company, Bagel Nosh experienced

its share of problems and went into default on its payments to
Capital•

6.

Bagel Nosh's initial default on the obligation led to the

restructuring

of

the

agreement

between

the

parties.

The

restructuring was reduced to writing in a document entitled Loan
Restructure Agreement, dated March 30, 1983.

R. 137.

That

agreement provided for modification of the original loan agreement
and included, among other things, reduction of the principal
amount, repayment of past due amounts, and that Sidney Seftel and
ACM/ms
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Michael Landes personally guaranty Capital's loan to the borrower
and provide the bank with current personal financial statements on
a yearly basis.

7.

After experiencing continuing financial problems, on

November 8# 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 187.

As a

debtor-in-possession, Bagel Nosh continued for a period of time to
make payments

to Capital pursuant

to the terms of the Loan

Restructure Agreement.

8. In an effort to protect their interests, Appellant and the
Seftels initiated the present action against Capital to determine
the existence and extent if any of their liability as guarantors
of

the

Bagel

Nosh

obligation.

In

response

to

Plaintiff's

complaint, Capital filed a counterclaim under which it sought
enforcement of the original Form 148 guaranty agreements.

9.

Following limited discovery by Appellant, on July 25,

1986, Capital

filed

its Motion

for Summary

Judgment

against

Appellant and the Seftels.

10.
Appellant

In response to Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed a Reply Memorandum in which it asserted that

Capital had failed to join the SBA, an indispensable party, in its
attempted enforcement of the original guaranty agreements. R. 208ACM/ms
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222.

11.

On February 4, 1987, Third Judicial District Court Judge

Timothy R. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision granting Summary
Judgment in favor of Capital on all issues.
issue

of

the

joinder

of

the

SBA,

Judge

R. 308-313.
Hanson

On the

explained:

"Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the
Small Business Administration, has not been joined.
is without merit.
pled,

but

That defense

In the first instance, the defense has not been

additionally,

the

SBA

is

not

under

the

present

interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to
this action."

12.

R. 311.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals recognized that the

SBA was a ninety percent (90%) participating lender and that the
guaranties which formed the basis of Appellant's liability were
executed on SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and Capital as "colenders."

13.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d at 943.

Following entry of the district court's partial final

judgment and decree of foreclosure, on June 4, 1987, Appellant and
the Seftels filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a supersedeas bond
in the total amount of the judgment, plus interest.

14. While the present appeal was before the Court of Appeals,
on March 17, 1988, the Seftels filed for relief under Chapter 7 of
ACM/ms
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the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Utah# Central Division.

On November 17,

1986, the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy was converted to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On April 15,

1987, an order was executed by the United States Bankruptcy Judge
closing the estate of Bagel Nosh.

15.
decision.

On January 12, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued its
In its opinion the Court of Appeals agreed that the

district court committed error in its analysis of the joinder of
the SBA but concluded that the fact the SBA had given Capital
written authorization to enforce the obligation rendered the error
harmless•

16. The condominium pledged by the Seftels as collateral for
their guaranty was subject to a first mortgage loan from Crossland
Savings. Following the filing of the Seftels' bankruptcy petition,
they went in default in relation to that obligation and the first
mortgage lender issued notice of a foreclosure sale of the property
for February 23, 1989. Prior to the Seftels' bankruptcy, Appellant
had obtained a third mortgage interest in the condominium to secure
his contribution to the issuance of the supersedeas bond.

On

February 10, 1989, Capital filed a motion in the United States
Bankruptcy Court to stop the scheduled foreclosure.

On February

21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court denied Capital's motion.

ACM/ms
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17.

Following

the

denial

of

its

motion

to

stop

the

foreclosure sale, on February 22, 1989, Capital and the SBA entered
into an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first mortgage
interest, substituted itself as trustee, and proceeded with the
foreclosure sale.

On the morning of February 23, 1989, Appellant

brought a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
on for hearing before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson in the
present case.

At that hearing, the SBA contested the motion by

relying, in part, on the fact that it was not a party in the action
and therefore not subject to the Court's jurisdiction or the stay
imposed by the supersedeas bond which had filed in the action.

18.

Following the district court's denial of Appellant's

motion for a temporary restraining order on February 23, 1989, the
SBA

proceeded

with

the

foreclosure

and

sold

the

Seftel's

condominium to Capital. The SBA's sale of the property eliminated
Appellant's junior lien position in respect to that property.

19. Appellant filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with
this Court on March 2, 1989. Appellant's petition was granted by
the Court on June 12, 1989.

ACM/ms
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ARGUMENT
JOINDER OF THE SBA AS A NECESSARY PARTY
IS MANDATORY
Rule 19 U.R.C.P. provides that a necessary party who is
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
shall be joined as a party in the action.

Thus, the joinder of a

necessary party is mandatory if that party is subject to service
of process and joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
See Intermountain Phy. Med, v. Micro-Dex, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App.
1987); State v. Dist. Court of Fifth Jud. Dist. 742 P.2d 464, 467
(Mont. 1987); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C. App.
1988); Prutch Bros. TV v. Crow Watson No. 8, 732 P.2d 241, 243
(Colo. App. 1986) ("[Rule] 19(a) is mandatory, and requires the
trial court to join persons falling within its provisions, if
feasible.")

The

absence

of

a

necessary

party

is

fundamental

and

jurisdictional Vitale v. City of Kansas City, 701 S.W.2d 213 (Mo.
App.

1985).

The mandatory nature of Rule 19(a) has lead some

Courts to hold that an order entered in the absence of a necessary
party is void.
N.E.2d

See Chariot Holding, Ltd. v. Eastmet Corp., 505

1076, 1084 (111. App. 1 dist, 1987); Zurich Insurance

Company v. Ravmark Industries, Inc., 494 N.E.2d 630, 632-633 (111.
App. 1 Dist. 1986).

ACM/ms

As the Appellate Court of Illinois explained
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in In re Adoption of Ledbetter, 465 N.E.wd 962, 964 (111. App. 4
Dist. 1984):
The requirement of joinder of necessary parties is
absolute and inflexible. (citation omitted) Both the trial
and appellate court have a duty to enforce this principle of
law sua sponte when it is brought to their attention,
(citation omitted) An order entered without jurisdiction over
a necessary party is null and void.

This court recognized the jurisdictional nature of the rule
in Hilts ley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).

In Hilts lev, the

Court raised the issue of the joinder of a necessary party, sua
sponte, and reversed and remanded the case with instructions that
a necessary party be joined in the action pursuant to the directive
of Rule 19(a).

See also Vitale v. City of Kansas City, 701 S.W.2d

at 215.

The Appellate Court's decision in the present case stands in
direct contradiction to this Court's decision in Hiltsley.
present

case,

the

Appellate

Court

agreed

with

In the

Appellant's

contention that the district court committed error by not following
the analytical steps required by Rule 19.

Seftel v. Capital City

Bank, 767 P.2d at 945. In describing the analysis dictated by Rule
19, the Appellate Court explained:
Pursuant to subsection (a), "a court must first determine
whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the action
to make it a necessary party," considering the criteria set
forth in the rule." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at
945, (quoting from Manyooats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558
(10th Cir. 1977)).
ACM/ms
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The Appellate

Court correctly observed

that pursuant to

subsection (a) of Rule 19, a court must first determine whether an
absent party has sufficient interest in the action to make it a
necessary party•

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 945.

However, the Court of Appeals continued its analysis by explaining:

If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is deemed
"necessary," a court must then proceed to subsection (b), and
determine whether the party is indispensable,... Seftel v.
Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 945.

This interpretation of Rule 19 overlooks a critical step in
the overall analysis.

Before a court proceeds to a determination

of whether or not a necessary party is indispensable, that court
must

determine

litigation.

if the necessary party can be

joined

in the

The factors presented in Rule 19(b) should be applied

only if joinder of the necessary party is not feasible. Withinaton
v. Cloud, 522 So.2d 263, 264 (Ala. 1988).

If a party is deemed to be necessary and can be joined in the
action, then joinder is mandatory under Rule 19(a).
Bros. TV v. Crow Watson No, 8, 732 P.2d at 243.

See Prutch

See also J & B

Slurry Seal v. Mid-South Aviation, 362 S.E.2d 812, 822 (N.C. App.
1987).

This Court in Hilts ley and the Court of Appeals in

Intermountain Phv. Med, v. Micro-Dex, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App.

ACM/ms
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1987) recognized and enforced the mandatory joinder requirement of
Rule 19(a).

After explaining its interpretation of the two step process
provided by Rule 19, the Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze the
question of the SBA's status as "indispensable" under Rule 19(b)
and concluded that based on the undisputed facts before the court,
the SBA was not an indispensable party.
Bank, 767 P.2d at 946.

Seftel v. Capital City

By addressing the issue of whether or not

the SBA was an indispensable party, the Appellate Court implicitly
recognized SBA's status as a necessary party under Rule 19(a).
The Appellate Court's failure to consider whether or not the SBA
could be joined as a necessary party in the action constitutes
reversible error.

It should be noted that pursuant to federal statute the SBA
by and through its administrator may sue and be sued in any court
of a state having general jurisdiction.

15 USC Section 634(b)(1).

Therefore, the SBA can be joined in the present action.

By failing to require the joinder of the SBA as a necessary
party,

the

Appellate

Court

overlooked

the mandatory

requirements of Rule 19 and committed reversible error.

ACM/ms
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joinder

THE SBA IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
AS TO NINETY PERCENT OF THE OBLIGATION AND
THEREFORE A NECESSARY PARTY

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel for
Capital represented to the trial court that the SBA had no legal
interest in the guaranties which form the basis for the Appellant's
potential liability.

Capital continued to advance this position

before the Court of Appeals. See Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767
P.2d at 946.

There is no question that as a participating lender, the SBA
has a significant interest in the present action.

Respondent's

representations to the contrary are unsupported by the record and
simply not true.

Throughout these proceedings,

counsel

for

Respondent has misstated the record or failed to accurately present
the facts.

For

example,

in

Respondent's

Appellant's petition, Capital stated:

brief

in

opposition

to

M

In the instant case, the

district court found that the SBA was not necessary to this
action".

(Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for

a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, P. 6.)

At no

time in these proceedings has the district court entered a finding
that the SBA was not necessary to this action.

In fact the

district court has failed to make any findings on the issue of
joinder.
ACM/ms
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Respondent now argues that the SBA has no interest in the
obligation and does not have a direct claim or cause of action
against Appellant.

(Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 10.)

As a participating

lender and joint obligee on the guaranty agreements, the SBA has
both an interest in the present action and a cause of action
against Appellant.

If the SBA had no interest in the obligation,

why would it provide Capital with a written authorization to sue
on the guaranties?

In fact, in a recent proceeding before the district court in
which

Appellant

sought

to

enjoin

Capital

and

the

SBA

from

foreclosing the collateral pledged as security for the Seftels'
guaranty, the SBA admitted that it had an interest in the action.1

Pursuant to separate agreement between the SBA and Capital,
on February 22, 1989, the SBA purchased the first mortgage holder's
interest in the collateral pledged by the Seftels in this case.
Notwithstanding the existence of a supersedeas bond in the full
amount of the present judgment, Capital and the SBA entered into
an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first mortgage interest
on the eve of its scheduled foreclosure and the SBA proceeded at
the foreclosure sale to sell the property to Capital. Based in
part upon the representation of Capital's counsel that it had
nothing to do with the SBA's actions, the District Court denied
Appellant's motion for a temporary restraining order and allowed
the sale to proceed. In its answer to a subsequent lawsuit between
the parties, Capital admitted that it had in fact entered into an
agreement with the SBA concerning the transaction. By foreclosure
of its junior lien position, Appellant has been harmed by the
concerted actions of the SBA and Capital.
ACM/ms
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In fact, the SBA has admitted to the district court that it
will receive its ninety percent

(90%) portion of all monies

collected by Capital in this action.2

Thus,

in

direct

contradiction

to

Capital's

prior

representations, the SBA has admitted that it has a substantial
interest in the action.

This interest renders the SBA the real

party in interest as to its ninety percent share and a necessary
party to the litigation.
THE APPELLATE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE
SBA CAN AUTHORIZE A CO-OBLIGEE TO ENFORCE
THEIR JOINT CLAIM CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR

Following its discussion of the analytical process provided
by Rule 19, the Court of Appeals recognized that the majority of
courts have concluded that joint obligees are deemed indispensable
parties in a suit against an obligor. Seftel v. Capital City Bank,
767 P.2d at 946.3

Refusing to follow this clear precedent, the

2

However, the SBA compared its status to that of an insurer
who has been required to pay the insured amount. Even if this
Court were to accept the SBA's characterization of its status as
a subrogated insurer rather than a joint obligee, the great weight
of judicial precedent would require the conclusion that the SBA was
a necessary party under Rule 19(a). See Compton v. D'Amore, 475
N.Y.S.2d 463 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1984), see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Collins, 491 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Mun. 1985).
3

The Uniform Commercial Code has made this general rule a
statutory requirement in relation to suits to enforce negotiable
instruments. See Section 70A-3-116 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
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Court of Appeals concluded that the SBA, although a joint obligee,
was not an indispensable party under the facts of the present case
because it had given Capital written authorization to sue on the
guaranties.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 946.

The Appellant Court's conclusion that by authorizing a fellow
obligee to judicially enforce the obligation owed to them a joint
obligee can remove itself from the joinder requirements of Rule 19,
is unsupported by any legal precedent and contradicts this Court's
decision in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984).

In Kemp, this Court recognized that courts have universally
held that an individual partner may not sue in his own name to
enforce a liability owed to a partnership, and one partner's
failure to join all partners as plaintiffs is grounds for dismissal
for lack of necessary parties.
Rule 19(a))

Id. 680 P.2d at 759.

(citing to

As this Court explained in Kemp:

Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same
interests: judicial economy and fairness to the parties in
litigation....
In addition,
by requiring joinder of
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of
parties who are present by precluding multiple litigation and
contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the
original litigation.
*
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Rule 17(a) serves essentially the same policy by
requiring an action to be brought by the real party in
interest. Id. 680 P.2d at 760.4
As co-obligees, Capital and the SBA have assumed the status
of de facto partners. As the Court of Appeals noted, the affidavit
of M. A. Allem, Capital's executive vice president, established
that the SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital to
Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding
unpaid balance.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 944. In

addition, the SBA is named as a joint lender on the guaranties.
It must be inferred from these undisputed fact that the SBA has a
claim against the guarantors for ninety percent

(90%) of the

outstanding balance of the loan.5

Simply

stated,

the

SBA has

a claim

under

the

guaranty

agreements for recovery of ninety percent (90%) of the obligation,
and Capital has a claim for ten percent (10%) of the outstanding
obligation.

Together the de facto partnership has a claim for

repayment of the entire amount.

4

As this Court held in Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748
(Utah, 1952), the reason the defendant has the right to have a
cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so that
the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another
and permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims
available against the real owner of the cause." (quoted in Kemp
v. Murray. 680 P.2d at 760.)
5

In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment
all facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom must be
viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the
action. See e.g. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526
(Utah 1979).
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Ignoring the status of the various parties and this Court's
holding in Kemp, the Court of Appeals held that the SBA can avoid
the joinder requirement of Rule 19 by authorizing Capital to
enforce the entire claim

in its individual capacity.

Thus,

although Capital is not the real party in interest in relation to
the SBA's ninety percent (90%) participation, it has received a
judgment in its name for the entire amount of the outstanding
obligation.6

The decision of the Court of Appeals has allowed the SBA and
Capital to circumvent the express terms and policy of both Rule
19(a) and Rule 17(a).

Under Rule 17, every claim must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest.

Rule 17(a) U.R.C.P.

The mere

appointment of an agent by a principal obligee can not make him the
real party in interest.
(N.C. App. 1985).

Goodrich v. Rice, 331 S.E.2d 195, 199

As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained

in Howard v. Boyce. 146 S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. 1966):

6

Rule 17(a) reflects a policy against the use of sham
plaintiffs.
As the Supreme Court of Alaska explained in
Municipality of Anchorage v. Baucrh Const., 722 P.2d 919, (Alaska
1986): "Since the insured did not have to sue for the amount for
which it had already been reimbursed and since the insurer's claim
was being directly litigated, there was no reason that the insurer
should not be made a named party." Id. 722 P.2d at 924.
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[I]t has been consistently held that an agent for another
could not maintain an action in his name for the benefit of
his principal.
The Court of Appeal's decision, which contradicts this Court's
holding in Kemp and ignores the statutory protections afforded
Appellant by Rules 19(a) and 17(a), constitutes reversible error.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AND APPELLATE COURT'S
FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE THE ANALYSIS REQUIRED
BY RULE 19 CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR

Accepting the arguments advanced by Appellant, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the district court committed error below in
failing to appropriately analyze the issue of joinder under Rule
19.

However, in affirming the entry of summary judgment against

Appellant, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's
failure to follow the two-steps analysis outlined in Rule 19 was
harmless error.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 946.

In Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah
1983) this Court explained that an error is reversible if there is
a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have
been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the error.
See alsof Matter of Estate of Kesler. 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985).

In the present case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that if,
upon a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the
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trial court's ultimate conclusion not to join the SBA then any
procedural error committed by that court would be harmless.

The

Court of Appeals then found that the SBA's written authorization
to Capital supported the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the
SBA was not an indispensable party.

Under the two-step analysis prescribed by Rule 19(a) and
19(b), the questions presented to the trial court were; (1) whether
the SBA was a necessary party under Rule 19(a); (2) could the SBA
be joined in the present action; and (3) if that necessary party
could not be joined was it so indispensable to the action that in
equity and good conscience the action should not proceed.

See

Manvaoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10 Cir. 1977).

It follows that if a necessary party can be joined in the
action then the Court need not reach the question of its status as
indispensable and any decision on that issue would be irrelevant
to the case.

Because of the district court's recognized procedural error,
which included the failure to express findings of fact on the
issues involved, that court failed to explain the basis for its
ultimate decision that the SBA was not indispensable.7 To compound
7

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Manyaoats v.
Kleppe, 558 F.2d at 559 that the district court should state the
facts and reasons upon which it acted in analyzing the issue of
joinder under Rule 19.
The Court of Appeals recognized this
requirement that the district court make and express its finding
ACM/ms
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the problem, the Court of Appeals failed to undertake the analysis
required by Rule 19.

Rather than analyzing the issue, it simply

reviewed the record to determine if there was clear evidence to
support the trial court's conclusory statement that the SBA was not
indispensable•

As the Court of Appeals expressly recognized, such conclusory
statements of an ultimate conclusion, whether voiced by the trial
court or the Court of Appeals, are of no value and do not comply
with the requirements of the rule.

Had either the trial court or the Court of Appeals undertaken
the analysis required by Rule 19, the SBA would have been joined
in the action.

Therefore, there exists a reasonable likelihood

that a more favorable result would have been obtained by the
Appellant in the absence of the error.

The district court and Appellate Court's failure to properly
analyze the issue and render findings of fact in support of each
of the three questions presented by Rule 19 constitutes reversible,

of fact in ruling on this question. Seftel v. Capital City Bank,
767 P.2d at 944. As the Tenth Circuit Court explained in Wright
v. First National Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th
Cir. 1973). "It is the function of a trial court to make decisions
that may be reviewed understandingly by an appellate court." The
Utah Supreme Court has previously held that, standing alone, a
district court's failure to make findings is reversible error.
See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) (relied upon by the
Court of Appeals in the present case); Romrell v. Zions First
National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
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rather than harmless, error.

CONCLUSION

The district court and the Court of Appeals both issued
conclusory explanations of why the SBA was not an indispensable
party in the present action.

By reaching the issue of the SBA's

status as an indispensable party both courts were required to
conclude that it was a necessary party under Rule 19(a).

A

necessary party must be joined in the action if that party is
subject to service of process and its joinder will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction.

Pursuant to federal statute, the SBA is subject to service of
process and may be joined in the present action without depriving
the

court

of

jurisdiction.

Therefore,

as

a co-obligee

necessary partyf its joinder is required by Rule 19(a).

and

And, any

order entered by the district court in its absence is null and
void.

The Court of Appeals failed to recognize and enforce the
mandatory

joinder provisions

of

Rule

19(a) in affirming

the

district court's entry of summary judgment against Appellant. That
failure constitutes reversible error.

This Court should reverse the Court of Appeal's affirmance of
ACM/ms
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the district court's judgment, hold that judgment void, and remand
the matter to the district court with a directive that the SBA be
joined in the action.

Dated this *^& day of August, 1989.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Daniel W. Jackson

David Connors

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ^

day of August, 1989# I mailed

a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following individual;
Steven T.
WATKISS &
310 South
Salt Lake
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WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-3300

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital City Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
and MICHAEL LANDES,

Civil No. C86-1810
(Judge Hanson)
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Plaintiffs,
vs.

<

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,

-I

Defendant.

<
in

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Counterclaim Defendants.
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Note of Bagel Nosh
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Records of Utah Department of Business Regulations regarding Bagel
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3

Bagel Nosh Bankrutpcy Statement of Affairs
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Seftel Guaranty (SBA Form 148)
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Seftel Trust Deed

6

Landes Guaranty (SBA Form 148)

7

Landes Trust Deed

8

Loan Restructure Agreement

9

Records of Utah Department of Business Regulations regarding Powder
Hound

10

Judgment by Default (Crossroads v. Powder Hound)
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Answers of Seftel and Landes (Crossroads v. Powder Hound)
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Utah Division of Commercial Code UCC-11 Search regarding Bagel
Nosh

13

Affidavit of M.A. Allem (Capital City Bank)

14

Utah State Tax Commission, Tax Warrant regarding Seftel and Landes
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Judgment by Default (YESCO v. Seftel)
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Affidavit of Richard L. Skankey (Olympus)
DATED this 2^f

day of July, 1986.
WATKISS <5c CAMPBELL

feven T. Waterman
Attorneys for Capital City Bank
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Debtor! or wWch may hate been, ere. or hereafter may be held by any party aa trustee or oiKenr.se, aa secunty. whether immediate or underlying.
l«rformancc of this guaranty or the payment of the Liabilities ot an, of them or any security therefor.
The Undersigned waivee any notice of the incurring by the Debtor at any lime of any of the Liabilhiea. and waives any and aQ presentment, d
protest or notice of dishonor, nonpayment, or other default ».tb respect to any of the Liabilitiea end any obligation of any party at any tunejeni
in the collateral. The Undersigned hereby grants to Lender full power, in iu uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the unaligned, hut
to the provisions of any agreement between the Debtor or any other party and Under at the time in force, to deal in any manner with the LtamJit
:he collateral including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powera:
<a> Tn modify or otherwise change any term* of all or any part of the Liabilitiee or the rate of interest thereon (but not to increaae the p
amount of the note of the Debtor to Lenders to grant any extension or renewal thereof and any other indulgence with respect thereto,
effect any release, compromise or settlement with respect thereto;
tb> To enter into any agreement of forbearance with respect to all or any part of the Liabilities, or with respect to eU or any part of the col
and to change the terms of any such agreement;
«c> To forbear from calling for additional collateral to secure any of the Liabilities or to secure any obligation comprised in the collateral;
<d> To consent to the substitution, eirhange. or release of all or any pnrt of the collateral whether or not the collateral if aay. received by
upon any inch substitution, eachange. or release shall be of ibe same or of a different ehnmcter or value than the collateral surrende
Lender;
•*• In the event of the nonpayment *hen due. whether bv acceleration or otherwise, of any of the Liabilities, or in the event of default in the p.
ance of any obligation comprised in the collateral, to realiae on the collateral or any part thereof, as a whole or in inch parcels or sub
interest! as Lender aay elect, at any public or pmate tale or sales, for cash or on credit or for future delivery, without demand, adverti
or notice of the time or plac* of sale or anv adjournment thereof <the Undesigned hereby wntving any such demand, advertisement and iw
the extent permitted by law*, or hy foreclosure or otherwise, or to forbear from realizing thereon, all as Lender in its uncontrolled discretk
deem proper, and to purchase all or any part of the collateral for its own account at any such sale or foreclosure, such powers to be excret*
to the extent permitted by law.
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder shall not he released, discharged or » any way affected, nor shell the Undersigned hare aay ri
recourse against Lender, hy reason A any action Lender may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers.
In ease the Debtor ahnO fail to pay aO or any part of the Liabilities when due. whether hy acceleration or otherwise, according to the terms «
note, the Undersigned, immediately upon the written demand of Under, will pay to Under the amount due and unpaid by the Debtor as afore*
like manner as if such amount constituted the direct and primary obligation of the Undersigned. Under shall not he required, prior to any such demi
or payment by. the Undersigned, to make any demand upon or pursue or exhaust any of its rights or remedies against the Debtor or others with
to the payment of any of the Liabilities, or to pursue or exhaust any of its rights or remedies with respect to any part of the collateral The Lndei
shall have no right of subrogation whatsoever with respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unless and until Under shall have received full payment
the Liabilities.
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder, and the rights of Lender in the collateral shall not he released, discharged or in any way affect«
»hall the Undersigned have any rights against lea4tr: by reason of the fact that any of the collateral may be in default at the time of acceptance I
hv Lender or later; nor hv reason of the fact that a valid lien in any of the collateral may not be conveyed to. or created in favor of. Under; nor by
o< the fact that any of the collateral may be subject to equities or defences or claims in favor of others or may be invalid or defective in any way;
reason of the fact that any of the Liabilities mav be invalid for anv rr««on whatsoever; nor by reason of the fact that the value of any of the collateral
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under or guarantor of an* of the collateral may not have been correctly estimated or may have cl
or may hereafter change; nor by reason of any deterioration, waste, or loss by fire, theft, ot otherwise of any of the collateral unless such deterk
waste, or loss be caused by the willful act or willful failure to act of Under.
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Under, or the holder of the afore«aid note of the Debtor, upon demand, but not more often than semian
** long as any part of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid, a financial statement setting forth, in reasonable detail the assets, Hal
and net worth of the Undersigned.
The Undersigned acknowledges and understands that if the Small Business Administration (5BAI enters into, has entered into, or wilt enter
Guaranty Agreement, with Ltn4tr or any other lending institution, guaranteeing a portion of Debtor's Liabilities, the Undersigned agrees that it ii
coguarantor with SBA and shall have no right of contribution against 5BA. The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder »hal! c<
notwithstanding payment hy SBA under its Guaranty Agreement to the other lending institution.
The term "Undersigned** as used in this agreement »hall mean the signer or signers el this agreement, and such signers, if more than one. si
jointly and severally liable hereunder. The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder shall continue notwithstanding the incapacity. 1
authority, death, or disability of any one or more of the Undersigned, and that any failure hy Under or its assigns to file or enforce a claim sgait
estate of any of the Undersigned »bal» not operate to release any other of the Undersigned trots liability hereunder. The failure of any other per
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect the liability of any signer hereof.

Theresa L. S e f t e l '
NOTE.—Corporate guarantors must execute guaranty in corporate name, hy duly authorined onker, and Malmust "tfe* affile, and duly att
partnership guarantors must execute guaranty in firm name, together with signature of a general partner. Formally executed guaranty ia to be del
at the tiae nf disbursement of loan.

(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATERAL SECURING THE GUARANTY)
S«A FORM tag) (t.7SI RKfr fO*> 70 SO UtC i-71 COITION UN Tit. | X H * U l T I O

ft Ante
fa order to induce A ? ^ . . $ D . < L . Q 3 £ i £ A l . . C i t X . . . (hereinafter tailed "Lender") to make a loan or loans, or renewal or extension thereof
(SBA or other Lending Institution)
. l a * f i ^ ! i ^ t . f . ^ ^ 5 . 1 1 ^ . H ? . . < J « ? . - . >
i M .
c.H«. ,he - D e b . . , " . , the L d , « ,
hereby unconditionally guarantees to Lender, its successors and assigns, tbe due and punctual pavment when due. whether by acceleration or othei
in accordance with the terms thereof, of the principal of and interest on and all other sums payable, or stated to be payable, wtthxteipccrfo the note o
Debtor, made by the Debtor to Lender, dated - l Z - r 2 ^ . 7 9 n the principal amount of $3QQ,.OQOjOO»ith interest at the rate of . - ^ i f i f .
per
per annum. Such note, and tbe interest thereon and all other sums payable with respect thereto are hereinafter collectively calfal/Xiabilmes ** As sec
for the performance of this guaranty the Indersigncd berebv mortgages, pledges, assigns, transfers and delivers to Lender certain collateral tif any). 1
in the schedule on the reverse side hereof The term 'collateral" as used herein shall mean any funds, guaranties, agreements or other property or ngh
interests of any nature whatsoever, or the proceeds thereof which may have been, are, or hereafter may be. mortgaged, pledged, assigned, transferre
delivered directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the Debtor or the Lndersigned or any other part* to Lender or to the holder of the aforesaid note ol
Debtor, or which may have been, are, or hereafter mav be held by any party at trustee or otherwise, as security, whether immediate or underlying, lo
performeftee of this guaranty or the payment of the Liabilities or aa> of them or any security therefor
Tbe Undersigned waives any notice of the incurring bv the Debtor at anv time of anv of the Liabilities, and waives anv and all presentment, dem
protest or notice of dishonor, nonpayment, or other default with respect to anv of the Liabilities and anv obligation of any party at any time compi
m the collateral. Tbe Undersigned hereby grants to Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned, but tui
to tbe provissoe* af any agreement between the Debtor or anv other party and Lender at the time tn force, to deal in any manner with the Liabilities
the collateral, including, but without limiting the generality of tbe foregoing, the following power*
<e) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all or ant part of the Liabilities or the rate of in'erest thereon (but not to increase tbe prim
amount of the note of the Debtor to Lender), to grant any estension or renewal thereof and an> other indulgence with respect thereto, ant
elect any release, compromise or settlement with re*peel thereto;
<b) To enter into anv agreement of forbearance with respect to all or any part of the Liabilities or with respect to all or any part of tbe collate
and to change the terms of any such agreement;
<c> To forbear from calling for additional collateral to secare any of the Liabilities or to secure anv obligation comprised tn tbe collateral,
<d» To consent to the substitution, eichange. or release of all or any part of the collateral whether or not the collateral, if any. received by Lea
i any such substitution exchange, or relrase shall be of the same or of a different character or value than the collateral surrendered
<e* In tbe event of the nonpayment when due. whether bv accelr ration or otherwise, of anv of the Liabilities or in the event of default in the perfoi
ance of any obligation comprised la the collateral, to realise on tbe collateral or an> part thereof as a whole or tn «ucb parcels or subdretd
interests as Lender may elect, at aay public or pn>ate sale or sales, for cash or on credit or for future delivery without demand, advertises*
or notice of the time or place of sale or any adjournment thereof < the Undersigned herebv waiving any such demand, advertisement and notice
tbe extent permitted by law), or by foreclosure or otherwise, or to forbear from realizing thereon all as Lender m its uncontrolled discretion e
deem proper, aad to purchase all or any part of the collateral for its own account at any such sale or foreclosure such powers to be exercised «i
to tbe extent permitted by law
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder shall not be released, discharged or ta any way affected, nor shall the Undersigned have any rights
recourse agaiast Lender, by reason of any action Lender may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers.
fa ease tbe Debtor shaQ fafl ta pay all or any part of the Liabilities when due. whether bv acceleration or otherwise, according to the terms of «
note, the Undersigned, immediately upon the written demand of Lender, will pay to Lender the amount due and unpaid by tbe Debtor as sforesaid.
like manner as if such amount constituted the direct and pnmarv obligation of the Lndersigned Lender shall not be required prior to any such demand c
or payment by, the Undersigned, to make aay demand epon or pursue or exhaust anv of its neht« or remedies against the Debtor or others with respe
to the payment of aay of tbe Liabilities, or to pursue ot exhaust anv of its rights or remedies with respect to anv part of the collateral. Tbe Undersign*
shall have no ngbt of subrogation whatsoever with respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unless and until Lender shall have received full payment of *
tbe Liabilities.
Tbe obligations of tbe Undersigned hereunder, tnd the rights of Lender in the collateral. «haU not be released, divharced or in any way affected IH
shall the Undersigned have any rights against Lender bv reason of the fact that anv of tbe collateral mav be tn default at the time of acceptance them
bv lender or later; nor by reason of the fact that a valid hen in anv of the collateral mav not be cometed to, or created in favor of. Lender, nor by reasc
of tbe fact that any of tbe collateral may be subject to equities or defenses or claims tn favor of <»ther» or mav be invalid or defective in any way; nor h
reason of tbe fact that any of the Liabilities mav he invalid for »n% reason whatsoever nor bv reason of the fact that the value of anv of the collateral or ih
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under or guarantor of anv of the collateral mav not have been correct I v estimated or may have change
or may hereafter change; nor by reason of any deterioration, waste, or loss by fire theft, or otherwise of any of the collateral unies« such detenoratioi
waste, or loss be caused by the willful act or willful failure to act of Lender.
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Lender, or the bolder of the aforesaid note of the Drbtor upon demand, but not more often than semiannual!
so long as any part of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid, a financial statement setting forth, in reasonable detail the assets, liabilitie
and net worth of tbe Undersigned.
The Undersigned acknowledges and understands that if the *mall Business Administration < Q B *.» enter* into has entered into, or will enter mto.
Guaranty Agreement with Lender or aay other lending institution guaranteeing a portion of Debtor's Liabilities, the lndersigned agrees that it is not
c»guaraator with 5*BA and shall have no right of contribution against *»BA. The lndersigned further agree* that all liability hereunder shall eontmn
notwithstanding payment by SBA under its Cuarant) %grecment to tbe other lending institution.
The term "Undersigned" as used in this agreement shall mean the signer or signers of this agreement, and such signers, it more than one, shall bi
join'l) and severally liable hereunder The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder shall continue notwithstanding the incapacity laek »
authority, death, or disability of any one or more of tbe Undersigned, and that anv failure bv Lender or its assigns to file or enforce a claim against tb(
estate of any of the Undersigned shall not operate to release any other of tbe Lndersigned from liability hereunder The fatluaAf anv otbgr perwpkU
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect tbe liability of any signer hereof.

NOTE.—Corporate guarantors most execute guaranty in corporate name, by duly authorised officer, and seal must be affixed and duly attested:
partaersbip guarantors must execute guaranty In firm name, together with signature of a general partner. Formally executed guaranty is ta be delivered
at tbe tiaae of disbursement of loan.

(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATERAL SECURING THE GU4RANTY)
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EXHIBIT 7
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March 30. 19*3
Capital City Bank, (the Bank), agrees to modify the terms of the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, between the Bank aud Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd.,
Inc., (the Borrower), under the following conditions:
1.

The Borrower agrees to bring all accrued Interest current on March
30, 1983. Accrued interest on March 30, 1983, will be $15,937.61.
If the Borrower makes the payment of $5,557.50 on March 25, 1983, as
specified in the loan agreement now in effect, all of which will be
applied to interest, then the amount of accrued interest due will be
$10,380.11.

2.

The Borrower agrees to reduce the principal amount of the loan by
$2,746.09, leaving a principal balance of $296,000.00.

3.

The Borrower agrees to provide signed monthly operating statements
and balance sheets to the Bank until all indebtedness to the Bank is
paid in full. The Borrower will provide the statements within 30
days of the end of each month.

4.

The Borrower agrees to provide evidence of continuous insurance coverage on all collateral assigned to the Bank to secure the loan until
the loan is paid in full. If insurance on any of the collateral lapses
or is cancelled, then the loan may be accelerated.

5.

Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally guarantee the Bank's loan
to the Borrower. Each is personally liable for the entire indebtedness
to the Bank. Each agrees to provide the Bank by February 28th of each
year a current personal financial statement as specified in the loan
agreement dated December 24, 1*79.

6.

Any item in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, that is not
specifically modified by this loan restructure agreement remains in
full force.

7.

The Bank agrees to lower the Borrowerfs monthly payment from $5,557.50
per month to $4,000.00 per month for a period of one year as long as
interest is paid in full each month and principal is reduced by a
minimum of $500.00. If the payment does not cover interest in full
and a minimum principal reduction of $500.00 each month, then the
Borrower will increase the payment at least by the amount of interest
not covered and by a minimum of $500.00 to reduce principal. The
Borrower understands that if the rate in effect on March 30, 1983,
were to remain in effect until December 24, 1987, and that if the
payment of $4,000.00 were to be made each month, then the principal
amount due and payable on December 24, 1987, would be approximately
$230,000.00.

8.

The Bank agrees to reduce the increment over the prime rate from 2.75
percent to 2.25 percent adjusted quarterly. The prime rate will be
that then in effect at the Bank on January 1, April 1, July 1, and
October 1, of each year until December 24, 1987.
0001.^*7

Dated

c h l s 30th day o f March, 1983.

CAPITAL CITY BANK

By, ^^if/'df^

BAGEL NOSH INTERMOUNTAIN LTD., INC.
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SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

FIRST VARIABLE RATE FUND
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[| Steven T. Waterman (4164)
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital City Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

<A JL

SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
and MICHAEL LANDES,

CO

Plaintiffs,

I
D
h

Civil No. C86-1810
(Judge Hanson)

vs.

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Counterclaim Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM

000185
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If COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss.
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M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter

"Capital City"), the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding,
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.

3.

As Executive Vice President of Capital City, I am responsible for

supervising the maintenance of the books and records (including both accounting records
and loan files with correspondence) of that institution (hereinafter "Books and Records")
and am the custodian of the Books and Records.
4.

The Books and Records are maintained by several employees of Capital

City on a daily basis, are audited by a firm of certified public accountants, and are
examined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which insures the deposits
of Capital City.
5.

Entries in the Books and Records are made at or near the occurrence

of each entry or event.
6.

Each entry is made and recorded by an employee of Capital City having

knowledge of the facts to be entered and which employee has a duty to record as
part of her or his employment with Capital City.
7.

Each entry made in the Books and Records is made in the regular course

of the business activity of Capital City.
8.

Each entry is recorded in the ordinary course of the business activity

of Capital City.

i0(
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Records relative to tne loan wmcn

is the subject of the above-captioned proceeding.
10.
tf

The loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. (hereinafter

Bagel Nosh"), was made purusant to Part 101 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Small Business Administration, an agency of the United States of America (hereinafter
"SBA").
11.

SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh

to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance.
12.

On March 30, 1983, the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh was in default

for failure of Bagel Nosh (and Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes,
plaintiffs herein and personal guarantors of the obligation of Bagel Nosh) to make
the payments required under the terms of the note (and absolute, unconditional,
personal guaranties among other reasons.
13.

Pursuant to a Loan Restructure Agreement (Exhibit 6 to the Answer

and Counterclaim of Capital City) executed on or about March 30, 1983, the defaults
of Bagel Nosh and its personal guarantors were cured.
14.

On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition for relief

under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
15.

During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, from approximately

Novmeber 29, 1984, through December 27, 1985, reduced monthly payments on the
obligation of Bagel Nosh to Capital City were made by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel,
and Michael S. Landes as guarantors through their attorneys.
16.

Since at least January 25, 1986, the obligations of Bagel Nosh under

the note and the obligations of Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes
under their personal guaranties have been in default for failure to make payments
as provided in those instruments or as modified.

h*ve been made on the note of
of Capital City since December 27,1985.
18.

The amount due to Capital City from Bagel Nosh, Sidney Seftel, Theresa

Seftel, and Michael S. Landes pursuant to the note and absolute, unconditional, personal
guaranties as of March 31, 1986, is $265,848.07 plus accruing interest at the rate
of 11.75 percent per annum plus accruing costs and attorneys1 fees.
19.

No comments or complaints either formal or informal have been made

by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes to Capital City, or its employees
y
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or agents, relative to the Loan Restructure Agreement of March 30, 1983, until the
complaint was filed in the above-captioned action.
20.

At no time prior to the complaint, filed in the above-captioned

M

proceeding, have Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes made written

2 V

representations or notice to Capital City of the sale or other disposition of the
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equipment of Bagel Nosh in which Capital City has an interest.
21.

According to the Books and Records, no representations have been

made by Capital City, its agents or employees, to Crossroads Plaza Associates or
its agents or employees, that Capital City did not have or does not have an interest
in the personal property or equipment of Bagel Nosh.
DATED this

day of July, 1986.

7^fsZ?&>
M.A. Allem
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j j j ^ d a y of July, 1986.

Notary Public, residing at
4r»t4 U^e,
County, Utah
My commission expires:

ooot.es
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r,Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-3300
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
and MICHAEL LANDES,
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Civil No. C86-1810
(Judge Hanson)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,

<

Defendant.

<

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.

SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Counterclaim Defendants.

CAPITAL CITY BANK'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ooortffi

"Capftal City% by and through its counsel,
files this memorandum in reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant to leave of
this Court granted by the Honorable Scott Daniels pursuant to an Order dated October
2, 1986, which also continued the hearing in this matter to October 27, 1986, at 2:30
p.m. Plaintiffs (Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes) may be referred
to herein collectively as "Guarantors."
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS
Ld

-

I N

z O

1.

Capital City is the holder of all loan instruments relating to the Bagel

Nosh loan including the Note executed by Bagel Nosh in favor of Capital City on

I CO

December 24, 1979 (Exhibit 1 to Capital Cityfs Memorandum), and the guaranty
(A D
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;
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agreements of even date executed by each of the Guarantors. [Supplemental Affidavit
of M.A. Allem previously filed with this Court and a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit 17]
2.

The Guarantors have admitted that they are personally liable on the

Note in favor of Capital City and that the guaranties have continuing effectiveness
in the "Disclosure Statement by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan" dated October
8, 1985, which includes the "Plan of Reorganization by Proponents" dated October
8, 1985, which they have filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding and certified
copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 18.
ARGUMENT
The Guarantors are the only parties responding in writing to Capital City's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

They assert that genuine issues of material fact

exist precluding the availability of summary judgment. The GuarantorsT memorandum
asserts three points comprising four issues which are: (1) factual issues exist relative

ooo:.te£
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illTiimy' Cl^ytf i^M^ tmm mtttm <**Utmvh <D ttodtfteatioii of ttm Mote Asctmrged
tba Guarantors; (3) Capital City failed to join an indispensable party; and (4) Capital

- Cityfs recovery should be limited to Capital Cityfs participation in the Note. Each
of the issues is addressed herein.
POINT I
THE GUARANTORS ADMIT THE CONTINUING
VITALITY OF THEIR GUARANTIES
The Guarantors have alleged that actions of Capital City on or about October

Ui
y
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31, 1981, and in February 1985, discharged their liabilities under the guaranties.
However, the legal documents filed by the Guarantors in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy

2 0
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proceeding in referring to payment of Capital City explicity state that Capital City
will be "retaining the personal guarantors on the loan." See, Disclosure Statement

. 9 >*
<n I G

by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan, p. 26 (attached as Exhibit 18). That

, i
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document is dated October 8, 1985, and signed by counsel for the Guarantors. Thus,
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the liability has been expressly admitted or there has been an express waiver or consent
to any modifications in addition to all other arguments previously advanced by Capital
City.

POINT II
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS
The Guarantors concede the applicability of federal law to this action. In
order to ascertain if a genuine issue of material fact exists the law of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals must be applied.
To support their position, the Guarantors rely primarily upon dictum in United
States v. Abbruzzese, 553 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.Mich.1982) interpreting the "deterioration
clause" of the Form 148 guaranty. That Court states its opinion that its interpretation

oooc^s
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hotofaic of the Tenth Circuit In

Tractor ft: Implement Co* v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196

(10th Cir. 1957) upon which case the Guarantors also rely. However, the Joe Heaston

Tractor case did not deal with a Form 148 guaranty. Nor have the Guarantors cited

any authority where any court has ruled against the lender under a Form 148 guaranty.
Furthermore, after the 1982 Abbruzzese opinion, the "deterioration clause,"
now relied upon by the Guarantors, has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit earlier
this year in United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843 (10th Cir.
I —
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1986). The Tenth Circuit stated?
Therefore, in order to establish a 'willful act or willful failure to act,'
by the [lender] under the guaranty agreement, a guarantor must allege
more than 'gross neglect of a known duty.? A guarantor seeking to
establish Willfulness1 under this guaranty agreement must allege fa
purpose by the [lender] to diminish the value of the security in order
to intentionally injure the [guarantors]/ 785 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuits language is dispositive of this case.

J

No allegation of the complaint alleges any purpose by Capital City "to diminish
the value of the security in order to intentionally injure" the Guarantors. Indeed,
any allegation of that nature is highly improbable since the alleged loss arises from
execution on a default judgment against a corporation (in which the Guarantors are
the principals) which judgment arose from a suit in which the Guarantors were
co-defendants and who chose to answer the complaint on their own behalves but
permitted a default judgment to be entered against their corporation. Having failed
to set forth any allegations and provide any evidence of the "willfulness" requirement,
summary judgment against the Guarantors is appropriate. Accordingly, the Guarantor's
causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice.

iiOltfA&

THE GUARANTORS EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO
MODIFICATION OF THE NOTE

The Guarantors persist in their assertion that material modifications in the
Note discharged their obligations although their argument is in their memorandum
under the heading relative to willful loss of the collateral. At page nine (9) of their
memorandum, the Guarantors allege material alterations were made to the Note,
including extension of the term, without the consent of the Guarantors. However,
there was JtfO extension of the terms of the loan. The alterations were a reduction
u
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h
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of both the interest rate and the monthly payment. Further, on page ten (10) of their
memorandum, the Guarantors suggest in a non-sensical phrase that Capital City has
conceded some point and that there is no allegation that the Guarantors, in their
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individual capacities, consented to any alterations.
To be clear, Capital City has not conceded anything. Further, Capital City
reiterates its position stated in Point II at page fourteen (14) of its memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment and emphatically articulates that
the Guarantors, in their individual capacities, expressly consented in the guaranty
agreements to any and all modifications to the Note thereby waiving any and all rights
which they might have been able to assert*
Capital City also has provided additional information and argument which
(as the Guarantors have recognized) supports a position that notwithstanding the
express waiver there has been an implicit consent to the modifications or waiver
of their rights. See also Point I, supra.
Two of the cases cited by the Guarantors with reference to the alterations
are inapposite. Sauder v. Dittmar, 118 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1941) is an old Tenth Circuit
opinion which does not even deal with guaranties. Tomlin v. Ceres, 507 F.2d 642
*\

ooor^

Of ihm principal note will discharge
Dot does not address a specific waiver by the guarantor which is the issue
in this case.
The other two cases relied upon the Guarantors actually support the position
of Capital City. In Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp., 485 F.Supp. 1355
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the guaranty specifically required the lender to give notice to the
guarantor of any modification and to obtain his consent thereto. The lender * failed
to give notice or obtain the guarantors consent. Thus, the guarantor was discharged
ll
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of his liability. Notice is specifically and expressly waived in the guaranty agreements
executed by the Guarantors and which are at issue before this Court.

n •

< *

!i
0

Finally, F.D.I.C. v. Manion, 712 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1983), involved a guaranty
in which the guarantor expressly consented to modifications of the principal note

t:

2 >•*

but also provided a means for the guarantor to revoke his continuing guaranty. After
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revocation of the guaranty, the lender extended the Note and after default sought
to recover from the guarantor. The Courts opinion acknowledges that a consent
in the guaranty waives the guarantor's right to object to a modification or alteration.
In that particular case the alteration occurred after revocation, effectively discharging
the guarantor since the Court interpreted the waiver to apply only to extension or
modification of the Note prior to revocation of the guaranty. Implicit in the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning is if the extension had occurred prior to revocation of the guaranty,
the guarantor would have remained liable since the guaranty agreement waived the
rights of the guarantor.
In this case, the Guarantors have explicitly consented to the modifications.
The guaranties state that the Guarantors grant:
[T]o Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice
. . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, including,
but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powers:
6
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There is no provision in the guaranties for revocation as in the Manion case relied
upon by the Guarantors. If the Manion court had been faced with the facts of this
case, it is apparent that the guarantors would not have been discharged since the
guaranty agreements provide an explicit consent to the modification of the Note
without notice,
POINT IV
SBA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
The Guarantors last two arguments are that the SBA is an indispensable party
having a ninety percent (90%) interest in the Note and guaranties, and, therefore,
Capital City's recovery should be limited to ten percent (10%) of the outstanding
balance. Thoss arguments are meritless.
The general law concerning a party in interest is not available in the context
of negotiable instruments nor is the relationship between SBA and Capital City a
partnership as the Guarantors assert. The holder of a negotiable instrument has the
right to sue on the note regardless of actual ownership.

See, Utah Code Ann.

§70A-3-301 (1980). The obligor under the instrument is protected when the holder
of the instrument is paid since payment to the holder discharges the obligation. See,
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-603 (1980). In this case, Capital City is the holder of the
legal instruments, is entitled to collect the Note through suit or otherwise, and is
entitled to recovery thereon.
Furthermore, a participant to a loan is not an indispensable party since its
claims are only against the note holder (lead lender) as to its pro rata portion of the
proceeds and does not have a direct claim against the obligor. Hibernia National
7
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aBEKCU TO M d 14tS, 1407 (lOUi CIr. 1984). The interest of SB A is not
?a participation. SBA has agreed to participate in the loan to the extent of ninety
percent (90%) of the outstanding debt when certain conditions are satisfied.

The

loan was fully funded by Capital City, and SBA has not yet purchased any portion
of the debt. Consequently, the interest of SBA is only as a potential participant,
and at this point, SBA is not entitled to any proceeds to be recovered.
All parties necessary to a complete resolution of the issues before this Court
have been joined. Capital City, as the holder of the instruments, is entitled to summary
b)
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judgment for the full amount of the outstanding obligation plus applicable costs
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including attorneys 1 fees incurred.
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CONCLUSION
Capital City has met its burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists under the applicable law.

Accordingly, this case is ripe for summary

judgment which should be entered in favor of Capital City and against each of the
Counterclaim Defendants including Plaintiffs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3

day of October, 1986.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL

^.—a^

JSfeven T. Waterman
Attorneys for Capital City Bank
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

- > ~ day of October, 1986, I served the foregoing

Capital City Bank's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as shown below:
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ACkSON A WILKINSON
Arrow Press Square, Suite 200
165 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Kent W. Larsen
Thomas B. Green
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Neil B. Smith
P.O. Box 25728
336 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125
(VI
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Utah State Tax Commission
Mary Beth Walls, Assistant Attorney General
23 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Douglas Mortenson
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSON
658 East 180 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Maln3»iite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-3300
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
and MICHAEL LANDES,

Civil No. C86-1810
(Judge Hansen)

0

Plaintiffs,

4)

D
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0

vs.

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,

<

Defendant.
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J

<

CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.

SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Counterclaim Defendants.

SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM

f

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter

"Capital City") the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit.
2.

This affidavit supplements the affidavit filed in this action and executed

by myself on the 17th day of July, 1986.
i= <M
2 O

3.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.

4*

Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the agreement executed

between Capital City and the Small Business Administration of the United States
* 0 H
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of America (hereinafter "SBA") entitled "Loan Guaranty Agreement

(Deferred

Participation)" commonly known as SBA Form 750 executed on September 20, 1978,
by Capital City and SBA (hereinafter "SBA Participation Guaranty").

J
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5.

Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the SBA Participation Guaranty, Capital

City is the holder of all loan instruments, which in this case includes the note executed
by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., on December 24, 1979, which is Exhibit 1 to the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Capital City and the Guaranty
Agreements trf even date executed by Sidney-Seftel and Theresa L. Seftel and Michael
S. Landes attached as Exhibits 4 and 6 respectively to Capital City!s Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, and until those instruments are transferred to SBA, Capital
City is entitled to sue upon the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity
of the note and guaranties provided Capital City has obtained the written consent
of SBA.

r

f.

Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties involved

in this action, and Capital City has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA
and has been authorized in writing by SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties and
accelerate the maturity thereof.
DATED this ^JzT^ay

of

September, 1986.

M.A. Allem
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this { j f ^ d a y of September, 1986.
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Notary Public residing at
\(\UJ- /jJr i .
County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

Its

ooo- <[&

Capital City Bank

.

2200 So. State St. , Salt lake City, Utah PAU5
(Lender's name and full address)

•ad Small Business Administration {SBA;, an agencv ot the United States Government.
THFREAS. tne parties intend tor Lender to mate and SBA to guarantee loans to small Business concerns
pursuant to the Small Business Act, as amended, and Title V of ene Small Business Investment Ac;, as amendec
NOI. THEREFORE, tne names agree as follows:
1. Application lor Gworonty. Tnt« agreement shall cover only loans duly approved hereafter tor guararm bv
Lenoer and SBA aubiect to SBA's Rules and Regulations as promulgated trom time to time. Any loan approved bv
Lenoer contingent upon SBA's gus*ant% under tms -»>ieement shall be referred to SBA ror authorization upon trie
separate application* oi Lender and tne loan applicant.
2. Appro vol of Guaranty. S B \ shall either aprrcve in a formal loan authorization or decline the guaranty by
aritten notice re the Lender. Pttot to full disoursemenr ot the loan, soy change in the terms or conditions stated 10
the loan authorization shall be subiect to prior written agreement between SBA and Lender.
3. Closmg or6 Disbursement of Loons. Lena** «hsll close and disburse each loan in accordance with the terms
and condition* of the approved ."*r authorization ler.4er shall cause to be executed a ooce* and all additional
instruments am; 'alee «ucr othe* >"jon* mh»rr sha! , wons.srent with prudent closing practices, be requited m order
fully to protect o* preserve the interests of Lender and SBA in the loan, Immediately after the first disbursement of
each loan, Lender shall furnish SBA with a copy oi the esecuted note, sett.ement sheet* sad compensation agreement*
and guaranty fee mentioned in pa. agrapfc * berenr Turned arelv following any subsequent disbursements, Lender shall
furnish SBA with an eiecuied «ett',eiien: *heet.**BA shall be entitled at sn% time, afte* written notice to examine
and obtain coc«es of all notes, secutiry agreements, nstriments of hypothecation, al1 other agreements snd documents
'h»rem collectively called "Loan Instruments**', *nd »he lose :?payment records held by Lender which relste to loans
trait pursuant to this agreement.
4. ftanor* •M*o*ua. tender shal! cAmp'.e • and \»:«ard tc SB*, a written, ?.«rtet't s*.»*jft Tort.* This rejort
\ a l l be *'u- -» *h n 2 r 24 \* «*te* the end of the repv*f*ir»g period specified ir the report. £BA f a l l *>o: -e oH AT* ted
re po;c*5^f *•• _
ruted ;e.-cen!*ge of the ouistand'ng ra'ance of :he !oao 11 SBA de:*'<ttnf» -hat Lender's rai *u:e
:o p e e d» • -•*_ . •*•» sc?.:a*e s#a»u* in'orrystion caused sny svhs'antla! harm to the C l e m e n t .
5. % . v •; r ? s * w«r ••-a!' : ay V?M a onetime guaranty fee amounting to one jerceo* of the • •> •! *- >at
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directl) or i:«„"'e».t?, ha ^e o: recc.ve any benus, fee, ooiirtssion or other pa>ment or benefir in connection with
making or <*'V>c -g mv \ a n , except te.mbursenuent for chsrges or eipenses mcuired or compensation for actual
service* rendered.
9. Shoring of Repair •*? Proe»sds ond Colfstarol. Lender shall not acquire any prefe/entia! security, surety or
Irsursnce to protect .ts unguaranteed interest in a loan. All repayments, security or guaranty of any nature, including
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It* SBA Pvecfcose Prlvilofw* Notwithstanding am provision ot any agreement between SBA and Lender, SBA has
the absolute right a: any time tc purchase its guaranteed percentage ot ant loan in the interest of the Government o:
the borrower. Yithin 15 oavs of the Lender's receipt of SBA's written aecnanc so purchase the guaranteed percentage,
Lende* shall deliver to SBA a certified transcript of the ioan account showing date and amount o: each advance or
disbursement and repayment and shal; assign and deiiver to SBA the Loac instruments pursuant to paragraph * above.
{pott receipt oi these documents, SBA shall pay Lender the guaranteed portion of the amount then owing on the ioar.
pursuant to paragraph ? above.
12. Assignment of Interest if* Loon. A. Either party may assign, in whole or part, its rights or obligations unaerth:s
tgreement or any guaranteed ;oa& with tne prior written consent of the othet party including transfers pursuant tc
Secondary Participation Agreements '1.* C.F.fc. Part 120 §i20.5(aK$V,. B. Nothing in this agreement prohibits, upon
written notice to SBA, assignment bv the Lender (or holder of the Note) to other banking institutions provided 'I the
Lender retains an unguaranteed mtereat ot no: less than IC percent of the outstanding principal amcuot of tne i*an,
(2) SBA may continue to deal soteiv with tne Lender as to the entire loan Mtii (}« assignee shall have nc greater ::tnt<
man assignor.C. Nothing in this agreement prohibita Lende:. without notice tcSBA :ro» usinr any gua»an;eed <• *r asecurity for (!) Treasury Tas and Loan Accounts (Treasury Department Circular 92), (2* the deposit of public tunas.
K$) uninvested trust funds, or (4' discount Dot rowings at the Federal Reserve Bank, provided -a Lenaer nas not sole
or otherwise assigned any part of the guaranteed ioan, and (b) Lender retains full authority to perform its responsibilities under this agreement.
13* Terminatioru
a. Either part* mat- terminate this agreement upon no? less tran K oays written notice oy certi'' *c ma:, tc
the ©the: parry. Termination sr.al. not ahec: ?n* guaranty or any icar. rrev.:t»usiy authorized by *BA. This sutrara*
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This agree? em **a" irw- :c the r-taer;: ?:, aad be hinting upon :hr parties, their successors and assigns.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-86-1810

Plaintiffs,
vs,
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
:

SIDNEY SEFTEL, et al.,
t

Counterclaim Defendants.

Before the Court is defendant and counterclaimant Capital
City Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The interested parties

through their counsel appeared and argued their respective positions.

Following argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement to further consider the Memoranda of Points and Authorities submitted by the parties, and to conduct further legal
research.

The court has now had the opportunity to carefully

review and consider the arguments and legal authorities cited

ouones

by "the parties, review the supporting attachments and affidavits
of the parties, conduct independent research on the applicable
case authorities, and being otherwise fully advised, enters
the following Memorandum Decision.
In this case the defendant and counterclaimant Capital
City Bank (hereinafter "Capital") has moved for Summary Judgment
on plaintiffs1 Complaint seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs1
Complaint as a matter of law. Capital has also moved for Summary
Judgment on its Counterclaim against plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendants, including the plaintiff, the Utah State Tax Commission,
Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., seeking from the plaintiffs
the amounts claimed due on their individual guarantees, and
an Order of foreclosure on the trust deed at issue, and for
a further Order declaring that the interests of Capital are
superior to the claims, if any, of the remaining counterclaim
defendants, to wit:

Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza

Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping
Center, Ltd.
The issues and arguments in this case have been carefully
briefed by counsel, and therefore the Court does not undertake
to review the authorities applicable to the various positions.
The plaintiffs1 Complaint alleges against Capital in its
first cause of action that Capital has breached the guarantee

agr**a*nt #xftcut*d by the plaintiffs in favor of Capital. The
guarantees were made in furtherance of a note and trust deed
executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., (hereinafter "Bagel
Nosh") in which the plaintiffs were principals.

The guarantees

are absolute, unconditional and personal as to each plaintiff
in favor of Capital.

Bagel Nosh has filed a voluntary Chapter

XI Bankruptcy Petition.

The issues in this case are governed

by federal law in accordance with the agreements between the
parties.

Federal law is dispositive of the plaintiffs1 first

cause of action in that under applicable federal decisions from
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals the plaintiffs do not have
an actionable claim for unjustifiable impairment of collateral.
The Court is further of the opinion that even if Utah law was
applicable, no breach can be shown, all as more particularly
set forth by Capital in its Memoranda, the argument on which
the Court finds persuasive on those issues.
The plaintiffs1 second cause of action alleges reckless
loss of a security interest.

The materials submitted clearly

show that Capital perfected its security interests in the collateral.

It further appears that plaintiffs1 claim is again

based upon Utah law which is not applicable under the agreement
between the parties.

Under federal law, Capital has no duty

to maintain or perfect a security interest in the collateral
in that the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that defense.

00.0'"lG

A* £lui record Is clear that Capital has in fact protected its
security interests, even if Utah law were applicable, Capital
has complied.
Plaintiffs1 third cause of action alleges that the guarantees
are of no affect, because the underlying obligation was modified.
Under the terms of the guarantees, modifications have been authorized
in advance by the plaintiffs/guarantors. Certainly, the modifications which are in actuality more favorable to the plaintiffs/
guarantors cannot be complained of at this point by the guarantors
where they have paid under the guarantee since the default of
the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and if not estopped at this
point, have impliedly given their consent to modification.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived the defense
regarding modification, and if they have not so waived that
defense through the guarantees, they are estopped and have otherwise
consented to the modification.
The allegations of "material issues of fact remaining"
by the plaintiffs are without merit. The claimed factual issues
either do not actually exist, or if they do exist, they are
not material and substantial so as to require this Court to
deny Capitalfs Motion for Summary Judgment.
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the plaintiffs have executed
unconditional guarantees in favor of Capital to induce a loan
to their company, Bagel Nosh.

Bagel Nosh has defaulted, and

s
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Cipitil^Jji,entitled to resort to the guarantees which the plaintiffs
originally made.
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party,
the Small Business Administration, has not been joined.
defense is without merit.

That

In the first instance, the defense

has not been pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable
party to this action.
As to the remaining counter defendants, Utah State Tax
Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign
Company, and the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., to the
extent that they assert interests in the properties that Capital
seeks to foreclose, those interests are inferior to Capitalfs.
The Court concludes that Capital fs Motion for Summary Judgment,
both as to the plaintiffs1 Complaint, and as to Capital's Counterclaim should be granted, and that there are no material questions
of fact existing, and that the defendant and counerclaimant
Capital is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.
For the purposes of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's Motion on all the
bases alleged by Capital in its moving papers and supporting
documents, with the exception of the claims of laches, which
the Court determines would require a further hearing, and are
not ripe for Summary Judgment.

Counsel for Capital is to prepare an Order in accordance
with this Memorandum Decision, and in accordance with Rule 52(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to the bases granted,
and submit the same in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice
for the Court's review and signature.
Dated this

i^

day of F^bruaryl

1987.

?IMOTHY R. HANSON
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Attorneys for Capital City Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
and MICHAEL LANDES,

Civil No. C86-1810
(Judge Hanson)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL,
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Counterclaim Defendants.

PARTIAL FINAL
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

.

The motion of Capital City Bank, Defendant and Counterclaimant, for summary
judgment in the above-captioned proceeding was, after proper notice, heard before
this Court on October 27, 1986. In accordance with the Memorandum Decision in
this proceeding dated February 4, 1987, and in accordance with Rules 52 and 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, Capital
City Bank having established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as
more particularly set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court specifically
finding that there is no just reason for delaying entry of this judgment as final and
good cause otherwise appearing, this Court enters its judgment and decree of
foreclosure as follows:
1.

It is hereby adjudged and decreed that the absolute, personal, and

unconditional guaranty of Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel, Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants, executed on or about December 24, 1979, and the absolute, personal,
and unconditional guaranty of Michael Landes, Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
executed on or about December 24, 1979, are valid, subsisting obligations of Sidney
Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes.
2.

Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa

Seftel, and Michael Landes, jointly and severally, in the amount of $293,319.64 as
of February 15, 1987, plus interest on that sum after February 15, 1987, at the contract
rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually until said sum is paid in full.
3.

The judgment granted herein is final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the clerk is expressly directed to enter judgment as final.
4.

In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed

executed by Michael Landes on or about December 24, 1979, as a mortgage for purposes
of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed is subject to a mortgage

GOO^G

lien in favor of Capital City Bank which real property is situated in Salt Lake County
and described as follows:
Units 616, 617, and S-616 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in
Book "KKft of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and the Exhibits attached
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records. EXCEPTING, however,
from the common area all mineral or underground rights and being limited
to the surface rights only.
5.

The mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank referenced in paragraph

4 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the claims, liens, and interests of the
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company,
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., and all persons claiming by, through, or under
each of them.
6.

In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed

executed by Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel on or about December 24, 1979, as a
mortgage for purposes of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed
is subject to a mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank which real property is
situated in Salt Lake County and described as follows:
Units 705, 706, and S-705 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in
Book ffKKff of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and the Exhibits attached
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records, and amended by Amendment
to Condominium Declaration of The Lodge at Snowbird recorded October
26, 1977, as Entry No« 3014973 in Book 4569 at page 1149 through 1258
and re-recorded December 16, 1977, as Entry No. 3039149 of Official
Records. EXCEPTING, however, from the common area all mineral
or underground rights, and being limited to the surface rights only.
7.

The mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank referenced in paragraph

6 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the claims, liens, and interests of the
i n i t i o ;;.<*•

Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company,
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., all persons claiming by, through, or under each
of them, and all persons having liens, interests, and claims subsequent to December
27, 1979, including the lien of John N. Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley, and Elan
Management, Inc., pursuant to a judgment of this Court in Civil No. C85-6571 dated
August 27, 1986.
8.

Capital City Bank is granted a judgment foreclosing the mortgage

liens referenced in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein and ordering and directing that each
of the real properties described in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein be advertised and publicly
sold by or under the direction of the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in
accordance with the law with the parcel described in paragraph 4 being sold first
followed by sale of the parcel described in paragraph 6, that the sales be subject
to the redemption rights of any party in accordance with the applicable law but that
the purchasers at the sales are given the right of possession of the real properties
pending the period of redemption including the right to receive the rents, profits,
and issues derived therefrom.
9.

From the proceeds of the sale to be conducted by the sheriff in

accordance with paragraph 8 herein, the sheriff shall first retain his fees and then
pay to Capital City Bank or its attorneys, the total amount adjudged by this Court
in paragraph 2 herein to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael
Landes, with interest thereon at the rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually
until paid together with the costs and expenses of sale and all other costs, including
attorneys' fees as approved by order of this Court or so much of the judgment as
the proceeds will pay and that the sheriff obtain & receipt for the amount paid and
return the same to this Court together with a report of the sale conducted pursuant
to paragraph 8 herein.

000?i:Q

10.

After payment in full of all sums adjudged due and owing to Capital

City Bank, the unexpended and undisbursed remaining balance, if any, shall be deposited
by the sheriff into the registry of this Court together with a report of the sale
conducted pending further order of this Court.
11.

In the event the sales of the real properties in accordance with

paragraph 8 herein yield insufficient proceeds to satisfy the amounts adjudged herein
to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes to Capital
City Bank, then a deficiency judgment may be entered against Sidney Seftel, Theresa
Seftel, and Michael Landes jointly and severally for the deficiency remaining.
12.

Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, Michael Landes, and all persons claiming

by, through, or under each of them, and all persons (including but not limited to the
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign
Company, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., John N. Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley,
and Elan Management, Inc.) having liens or encumbrances recorded subsequent to
December 27, 1979, upon the real properties described in paragaphs 4 and 6 herein
and all persons claiming any interest in those real properties subsequent to the notices
of lis pendens filed by Capital City Bank on those properties, are forever barred and
foreclosed from all equity of redemption and claim of, in, and to those real properties
from and after delivery of the sheriffs deeds, upon expiration of the period of
redemption.
13.

Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa

Seftel, and Michael Landes dismissing all claims of the complaint filed against Capital
City Bank.
14.

The remaining issues relative to the award and proper amount of

attorneys' fees to be awarded Capital City Bank are to be determined by further
orders of this Court.

OOCXTSS

DATED this JO

day of May, 1987.
BY THE COURT

A
r *
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Pimothy R. Hanson
/District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

to 4
Darnel W. Jackson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE
In accordance with Rule 4, Supplementary Rules of Practice — Third Judicial
District, I, Steven T. Waterman, attorney for Capital City Bank, hereby certify that
on the /S

day of May, 1987, I served the foregoing Judgment and Decree of

Foreclosure upon the following by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Daniel W. Jackson
175 South Main, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent W. Larsen
Thomas B. Green
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR <5c CROCKETT
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Neil B. Smith
P.O. Box 25728
336 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125
Mary Beth Walz
Assistant Attorney General
Utah State Tax Commission
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSEN
658 East 180 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
John Whiteley
Barbara Whiteley
Elan Management, Inc.
2676 Skyline Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Lisa W. Bennett
3077 First City Tower
Houston, Texas 77002-6760
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Due to our decision herein, we need not
reach the parties' other arguments on appeal. The orders granting summary judgment and Zions' motion to dismiss are vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

primary obligations as an appellate court.
See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785
(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in
part, joined by Hall, C.J., Howe, A.C.J., and
Stewart, J.).
f O 5 KEY NUMBIR SYSTEM/

ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring in
the result).
I agree that this case should be remanded to the trial court because there were
adequate allegations in the complaints to
warrant further proceedings, under either
tort or contract rubric, that could lead to
the recovery of the damages spelled out in
section 70A-4-103 of the Commercial Code.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103 (1981);
U.C.C. § 4-103 (1978). However, I would
make it clear that the question of whether
the bank failed to act in good faith is quite
a different issue than whether it failed to
exercise ordinary care.
Section 70A-4-103 governs the remedies
available in this case as a result of either a
failure to exercise ordinary care or actions
taken in bad faith. Section 70A-4-103(5)
permits the collection of consequential (but
not punitive) damages when "bad faith" is
shown, but when nothing more is proven
than a "failure to exercise ordinary care,"
one may recover only "the amount of the
item reduced by an amount which could not
have been realized by the use of ordinary
care."l Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103(5)
(1981). The concepts of "good faith" and
its opposite, "bad faith," as well as that of
"ordinary care," should not be casually
smeared together under the rubric of
"good faith and ordinary care," as the majority appears to do at places in its opinion.
This sort of casual use of terminology invites conceptual misunderstandings by the
Bar, trial courts, and juries. In articulating the law, we should do so with some
analytical precision. That is one of our

Guarantors under note brought declaratory action against payee seeking order
discharging them from obligations under
the guaranties. Creditor counterclaimed to
enforce guaranties. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., granted summary judgment in favor of payee. Guarantors appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1)
colender was not an indispensable party to

1. Because the damages specified in section 70A4-103(5) are specially tailored for UCC violations and are more limited than what might be
available at common law, the result of this
statutory tailoring of damages is to make the

contract or tort designation of the cause of
action rather academic. Cf. Beck v. Farmers'
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985)
(comparing range of damages available in tort
and contract).

Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, and
Michael Landes, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation, Counterclaimant,
v.
Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, Michael
Landes, Utah State Tax Commission,
Crossroads Plaza Associates, a Utah
joint venture and general partnership,
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah
corporation, and Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD., a Utah limited partnership, Counterclaim Defendants.
No. 870312-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 12, 1989.
Rehearing Denied January 31, 1989.
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the case, where there was uncontroverted
evidence that colender had authorized lender to sue on note and related guaranties,
and (2) guarantors waived right, under
guaranty agreement, to raise defense of
impairment of collateral.
Affirmed.

„
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1. Appeal and Error <s=>187(3)
Parties <s=»80(l), 84(1)
Party to a lawsuit may raise the issue
of failure to join an indispensable party at
any time in the proceedings, including for
the first time on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 19(a).
2. Appeal and Error <3=»1036(3)
Trial court's failure to follow two-step
analysis, required under procedural rule to
determine if colender in a suit to enforce
note guaranties was an indispensable party, was harmless error, where there was
clear evidence supporting court's ultimate
conclusion that colender was not indispensable party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 19.

h

jr

3. Contracts <3=>330(1)
As a general contract rule, joint obligees are deemed indispensable parties in a
suit against obligor.
4. Guaranty <3=>82(2)
Colender under note was not indispensable party in action brought to enforce
guaranties of note, where uncontroverted
affidavit evidence from lender indicated colender authorized suit on note and related
guaranties and acceleration of their maturities.
5. Guaranty <s=>62
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his actions, impairs the value of collateral securing the underlying obligation, either absolute or conditional, guaranteed by guarantor, guarantor will be discharged from his
obligation to extent of impairment.
6. Guaranty <3»72
Guarantors under loan agreement
waived rights to assert defenses of impairment of collateral or modification of underlying obligation, under terms of guaranty
agreement, which provided for guarantors'

consent to release or discharge of collateral
and provided guarantors no recourse in the
event of such actions.
7. Guaranty <3=*72
There was no evidence, in action to
enforce guaranties of note, that lender's
actions were ''willful," so as to preclude
waiver of impairment of collateral defense
under guaranties relating to a Small Business Administration financed loan.
Daniel W. Jackson (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
David M. Connors (argued), LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Leiby & McRae, Salt Lake City, for
Landes.
Steven T. Waterman (argued), Herschel
J. Saperstein, Marco B. Kunz, Watkiss &
Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiffs/appellants,
Sidney Seftel,
Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes,
("guarantors") appeal from the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing their complaint and granting defendant/respondent,
Capital City Bank, ("Capital") judgment in
the amount of $293,319.64 and issuing a
decree of foreclosure. Guarantors seek a
reversal of the trial court's order. We
affirm.
FACTS
On December 24,1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., ("Bagel Nosh") executed a
note in favor of Capital in the principal
amount of $300,000. Under the terms of
the note, the Small Business Administration ("SBA") was a 90% participating lender. The note also provides it is to be enforced in "accordance with applicable federal law."
As additional consideration for the loan,
guarantors each executed unconditional
personal guaranties. The guaranties were
secured by trust deeds to real property
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owned by guarantors and located at Snowbird. The guaranties were executed on
SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and
Capital as "co-lenders." Specifically, the
guaranties state:
In order to induce Capital City Bank and
SBA (hereinafter called "Lender") to
make a loan . . . to Bagel Nosh Intermountain, LTD. (Inc.) . . . (hereinafter
called the "Debtor"), the Undersigned
hereby unconditionally guarantees to
Lender, . . . the due and punctual payment when due, . . . of the principal of
and interest on and all sums payable . . .
with respect to the note of the Debtor
The Undersigned waives any notice of
the incurring by the Debtor at any
time of any of the Liabilities, and
waives any and all presentment, demand, proiest or notice of dishonor,
nonpayment, or other default with respect to any of the Liabilities
The
Undersigned hereby grants to Lender
full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned . . . , to deal in any manner with
the Liabilities and the collateral, including, . . . the following powers:
(a) To modify or otherwise change any
terms of all or any part of the Liabilities . . . to grant any extension or renewal thereof . . . and to effect any
release, compromise or settlement with
respect thereto;

(d) To consent to the substitution, exchange, or release of all or any part of
the collateral
The obligations of the Undersigned
hereunder shall not be released, discharged, or in any way affected, nor
shall the Undersigned have any rights
or recourse against Lender, by reason
of any action Lender may take or omit
to take under the foregoing powers.
On March 30, 1983, following several
months of nonpayment, Bagel Nosh and
Capital entered into a Loan Restructure
Agreement ("Agreement") modifying the
terms of the original note. The Agreement

was signed by Sidney Seftel and provided
in relevant part:
Capital . . . agrees to modify the terms
of the loan agreement dated December
24, 1979, between [Capital] and [Bagel
Nosh] under the following conditions:
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes
personally guarantee [Capital's] loan
to the Borrower. Each is personally
liable for the entire indebtedness to
[Capital]....
6. Any item in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, that is not specifically modified by this loan restructure agreement remains in full force.
Guarantors complied with the terms of
the Agreement and made several payments
thereunder.
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed
a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. On March 11, 1986,
guarantors filed this action for declaratory
relief requesting the trial court to discharge them from any obligations under
their personal guaranties on the grounds
that Capital, (1) willfully impaired the collateral originally pledged to secure the
note, (2) recklessly lost their security, and
(3) substantially modified guarantors' obligations underlying the guaranties by the
Loan Restructure Agreement.
Capital counterclaimed requesting the
trial court to declare the guaranties and
corresponding trust deeds valid enforceable
obligations. Capital further requested a
judicial decree of foreclosure on the trust
deeds.
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion
for summary judgment on the issues in
guarantors' complaint and Capital's counterclaim. Capital claimed the note, Agreement, and guaranties were all in default.
Capital argued the guaranties were enforceable, thus, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, (1) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (1978),
as holder of the guaranties, Capital was
entitled to enforce them, (2) guarantors by
prior judicial admissions were estopped
from denying liability, and (3) under the
express provisions of the guaranties, guar-
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antors waived the defenses set forth in
their complaint.
In support of its motion for summary
judgment, Capital submitted, among a
number of documents, the affidavit of M.A.
Allem, Capital's executive vice president.
In his affidavit, Mr. Allem states in pertinent part that the "SBA is a participating
lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel
Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%)
of the outstanding unpaid balance."
On September 5, 1986, Capital filed the
supplemental affidavit of Mr. Allem which
stated:
5. Capital City is entitled to sue upon
the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity of the note and
guaranties provided Capital City has
obtained the written consent of SBA.
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the
note and guaranties involved in this
action, and Capital City has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA
and has been authorized in writing by
SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties
On September 11, 1986, guarantors filed
their memorandum in opposition to Capital's motion for summary judgment claiming for the first time that the SBA was an
indispensable party, and thus must be
joined in order for Capital to enforce the
guaranties.
On February 4, 1987, the trial court issued its memorandum decision granting
summary judgment in favor of Capital on
all issues in the complaint and counterclaim. Guarantors appeal this order.
I.
RULE 19—INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
In its memorandum decision, the trial
court found that Capital was entitled to
enforce the guaranties and the SBA was
not an indispensable party. Although we
1. The portion of Utah RXiv.P. 19 upon which
guarantors rely provides:
A person . . . shall be joined as a party in
the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest in
the subject matter and is so situated that his
absence may . . . (ii) leave any of the persons

find the trial court did not properly analyze
the issue of whether the SBA is an indispensable party, we affirm the trial court's
decision as we find based upon the undisputed facts in the record, the SBA is not,
as a matter of law, an indispensable party.
Required Analysis

Under Rule 19

In its February 4th memorandum decision the trial court stated:
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an
indispensable party, the Small Business
Administration, has not been joined.
That defense is without merit. In the
first instance, the defense has not been
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not
under the present interpretation of the
Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to this action.
[1] Guarantors claim the trial court
committed reversible error by permitting
Capital to enforce the guaranties without
making particularized findings pursuant to
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 While actual findings of fact were
not strictly required as this matter was
presented on a motion for summary judgment, the guarantors' basic contention is
well-taken. We note that Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules is substantively similar to its
federal counterpart, see Utah R.Civ.P. 19
compiler's notes, and in the absence of
Utah authority, we resort to the more
abundant federal case law for guidance.
We also note that a party may raise the
issue of failure to join an indispensable
party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal. See,
e.g., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v.
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 104 (3rd Cir.1986).
Accordingly, this issue is properly before
us.
Ordinarily, a trial court's
properly entered under Rule
disturbed absent an abuse
See, e.g., Bonneville Tower

determination
19 will not be
of discretion.
v. Thompson

already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest.
Utah R.Civ.P. 19(a).
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Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah
1986); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New
Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir.1987);
Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th
Cir.1982). Whether a party is indispensable to the action depends on a number
of factors all "varying with the different
rases, some such factors being substantive,
some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing
against opposing interests." Provident
Tradesmens B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 119, 88 S.Ct. 733, 743, 19 L.Ed.2d
936 (1968).2
[2] Federal authorities addressing the
analytical requirements of Rule 19 uniformly require a court to follow a two-part
inquiry. See, e.g., Ogalalla Land Ltd. v.
Wexpro Co., 587 F.Supp. 453, 454 (D.Wyo.
1984) (citing Wright v. First Nat'l Bank,
483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973)). Pursuant to
subsection (a), "a court must first determine whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the action to make it a
necessary party," considering the criteria
set forth in the Rule.3 Manygoats v.
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.1977).
If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is
deemed "necessary," a court must then
proceed to subsection (b), and determine
whether the party is indispensable, considering four factors: (1) to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence
will prejudice him or her or those already
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or
avoiding prejudice by protective measures
or provisions in the judgment; (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be
entered in the person's absence; and (4) the
adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the
2. Provident is the landmark case interpreting
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and it has been cited with approval in a number
of Utah decisions. See, e.g., Hiltsley v. Ryder,
738 P.2d 1024, 1025 n. 3 (Utah 1987); State v.
Toledo, 699 P.2d 710, 711 n. 4 (Utah 1985);
Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Price
River Water Users Assoc., 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 n.
5 (Utah 1982).
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 19(a) identifies the criteria a
court must consider when determining whether
a party is necessary and provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose

action is dismissed for nonjoinder. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 19(b). See also Wright v.
First Nat'l Bank of Altus, Oklahoma,
483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.1973). In light of
these factors, the ultimate test under Rule
19(b) is "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed." Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 558.
Furthermore, abstract generalizations
are not a substitute for the analysis required under Rule 19. Provident, 390 U.S.
at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 745.
The trial court in this action did not
follow the analytical steps required by Rule
19. The court failed to address the twostep analysis set forth above to demonstrate that the undisputed facts support its
ultimate conclusion. Instead, the trial
court merely stated that "the SBA is not
under the present interpretation of the
Rules of Procedure an indispensable party
to this action." Such conclusory statements do not comply with the rule. See,
e.g., Provident, 390 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. at
745; Wright, 483 F.2d at 75. As the Court
declared in Wright, "[t]hese conclusionary
statements are of no value because the
court finds no facts to support them." 483
F.2d at 75. (the trial court in Wright
stated "complete relief cannot be afforded
the remaining parties for all the reasons
set out in Rule 19").
However, a trial court's failure to follow
the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harmless error, if, upon a review of the record,
there is clear evidence to support the trial
court's ultimate conclusion. See Acton v.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987).
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of action shall be joined
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest
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[3,4] As a general contract rule, joint
obligees are deemed indispensable parties
in a suit against an obligor. See, e.g.,
Brackin Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v.
McLarty Farms, Inc., 704 F.2d 585, 586
(11th Cir.1983) (a review of the case law
reveals that the majority of courts hold
joint obligees are indispensable); Harrell
and Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody
Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir.
1977); Bry-Man's, Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d
585, 587 (5th Cir.1963); Purcel v. Wells,
236 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir.1956); Fremon
v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 209 F.2d 627,
633-34 (8th Cir.1954); Hanna Mining Co.
v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., 573
F.Supp. 1395,1399 (D.Minn.1983). See also
C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1613 at 185-86
(2d ed.1986). Joint obligees are ordinarily
considered indispensable because "[obligors have a 'right to stand upon their contract and insist that they shall not be harassed with different actions or suits to
recover parts of one single demand/"
Bry-Mans, 312 F.2d at 587 (citation omitted), (quoting McAulay v. Moody, 185 F.
144 (CC.0re.1911)).
Capital contends that the undisputed
facts in the record demonstrate there is no
possibility of multiple lawsuits because the
SBA has no legal interest in and, therefore,
cannot enforce the guaranties. Capital argues on appeal that the SBA is not a party
to the underlying note and has not funded
any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh.
Furthermore, Capital claims that the SBA
has given Capital written authorization to
sue on the guaranties. Therefore, Capital
claims the SBA is not, as a matter of law,
an indispensable party. To support its allegations, Capital directs our attention to the
affidavit of M.A. Allem which states that
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note
and guaranties involved in this action and
has been authorized in writing by the SBA
to sue upon the note and guaranties and
accelerate the maturity thereof."
No objection was made below to this
affidavit and no counter affidavit was filed,
thus we accept the factual allegations as
true on appeal. See Trimble Real Estate
v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 455

(Utah Ct.App.lS88); Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.2d 42,
46 (Utah CtApp.1988). Accordingly, Mr.
Allem's affidavit establishes that the SBA
has given Capital written authorization to
sue upon the note and the guaranties, and
thus, based on the undisputed facts before
us is not an indispensable party.
We do not, however, suggest that absent
such authorization by the SBA, the SBA
would necessarily be an indispensable party. Although the guaranties expressly run
to both Capital and the SBA, suggesting at
first blush that both would be indispensable to any action seeking enforcement of
the guaranties, the only obligation guarantied is the $300,000 note, which is payable
by Bagel Nosh solely to Capital. So long
as Capital is the holder of the note, as a
matter of ordinary commercial law there is
no obligation due under the note from Bagel Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, no
underlying obligation of Bagel Nosh which
the guarantors can be said to have guarantied to the SBA. However, federal law and
extensive federal regulation govern these
transactions which might conceivably require a different analysis but one we need
not reach in this case to find that the SBA
is not an indispensable party as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's determination.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING
GUARANTORS' COMPLAINT
To determine whether summary judgment was properly entered, we employ the
same analytical standard as that of the
trial court. Because summary judgment
deprives a party of its opportunity to
present its case on the merits, we review
the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the
judgment was granted. Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987). If, after a review of the record, we
conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists, we must reverse the summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings on that issue. Id.
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After a careful review of the record in
this case, we conclude the guarantors have
failed to raise genuine issues of material
fact and, as a matter of law, their defenses
must fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's order dismissing guarantors' complaint.
Impairment of Collateral
[5-7] We first address whether guarantors waived their right to assert the defense of "impairment of collateral." Based
on the express terms of the original guaranties dated December 24, 1979, we conclude guarantors waived this defense.

waiver and release of their rights in the
collateral. The Tenth Circuit, interpreting
the identical provisions of an SBA guaranty, has similarly held that this provision
amounts to a waiver by guarantors of their
right to claim impairment of collateral.
See United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 846-47 (10th
Cir.1986).

We are not persuaded by guarantors'
allegations that Capital acted "willfully."
We are mindful that parties to an SBA
guaranty do not waive an impairment of
collateral defense where the acts of a lender are deemed "willful." See New Mexico
Landscaping, 785 F.2d at 847-48. In orOrdinarily, when a creditor, by his ac- der to demonstrate the requisite "willfultions, impairs the value of collateral secur- ness" "a guarantor must allege more than
ing the underlying obligation guaranteed 'gross neglect of a known duty.'" Id. at
by a guarantor, "either absolute or condi- 848. "A guarantor ... must allege 'a purtional, the guarantor will be discharged pose by the [Lender] to diminish the value
from his obligation to the extent of the of the security in order to intentionally
impairment." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. injure the defendants.'" Id.
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742
Guarantors in this action have not alP.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citaleged
in their original complaint such a
tion omitted). A guarantor may, however,
purpose
by Capital, nor did they submit
expressly waive his or her right to raise the
affidavits
to support such a position.
defense of impairment of collateral. Id. at
Thus,
we
find
no error in the trial court's
109. See also Continental Bank & Trust
order
granting
summary judgment on their
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d
impairment
of
collateral defense.
1095, 1097 (Utah 1985); Heller v. United
States Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv.Rep. 8,
9 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Reckless Loss of
Security/Modification of Obligation
The provisions of the SBA guaranty
We further find guarantors' remaining
agreements, signed by each of the guarandefenses,
reckless loss of security and modtors, expressly waive an impairment deification
of
the underlying obligation were
fense:
properly
dismissed.
Guarantors have
[Guarantors] ... consent to the substitufailed
to
demonstrate
that
Capital did not
tion, exchange, or release of all or any
maintain
a
perfected
security
interest in
part of the collateral—
the
collateral
at
all
relevant
times.
FurThe obligation of ... [Guarantors] shall
thermore,
even
if
guarantors
could
identify
not be released, discharged, or in any
way affected, nor shall the [Guarantors] some technical transgression in Capital's
have any rights or recourse against [Cap- security interest, the language of the guarital], by reason of any action [Capital] anties previously identified in this opinion
may take or omit to take under the fore- clearly constitute a waiver of said transgressions.
going powers.
This language is clear and unequivocal
Finally, we reject guarantors' contenGuarantors have expressly consented to a tions that they are discharged from their
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obligations by reason of the Loan Restructure Agreement. Once again, the clear and
unequivocal language of the guaranties
empowers Capital "to modify or otherwise
change any terms of all or any part" of the
agreement.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of
Capital.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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